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Robert N. Clintont
Until the late nineteenth century, the United States generally
treated Indian tribes as self-governing political entities. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, characterized the tribes as "domestic
dependent nations" 1 ; to him, they were autonomous, but dependent, states that retained powers of self-government2 while assuming the protection of the United States. Even after the rapid westward movement of the frontier made the policy of physically
separating tribes from the states impossible, the federal government sought to protect the Indians' autonomy by denying newly
admitted states jurisdiction over the tribes within state
boundaries.'
Beginning in the 1880s, the political relationship between the
tribes, the states, and the federal government began to change; this
was the first of many fluctuations of federal policy between the
extremes of forced assimilation of Indians and the protection of
their legal, political, and cultural autonomy. In 1885, Congress established federal and state jurisdiction over some crimes committed between Indians on tribal lands,4 and in 1887 it asserted fedt Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law. The ideas offered in this
review originate in research the reviewer has undertaken for a forthcoming book on federal
authority over Indian affairs under the Indian commerce clause. Further elaboration of some
of these ideas may be found in Brief of Appellee Indian Tribes at 65-90, Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 100 S. Ct. 2069 (1980), to which the reviewer contributed.
I Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
2

Id. at 16.

See, e.g., Act of Jan. 29, 1861, ch. 20, 12 Stat. 127 (providing for the admission of
Kansas into the Union). See generally Clinton, Development of Criminal JurisdictionOver
Indian Lands: The Historical Perspective, 17 ARiz. L. REV. 951, 960-61 (1975).
As late as 1883, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over an intratribal murder lay
3

solely with tribal authorities, and denied federal jurisdiction. The court found the federal
policy of protecting tribal sovereignty dispositive. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
4

Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (1883) (current version at 18 U.S.C.

§ 1153 (1976)). See generally Clinton, supra note 3, at 962-64.
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eral power to allot tribal lands without regard to tribal wishes. The
ultimate goal of the allotment program was to put the Indians
under state control.5
The forced-assimilation policy of the federal government continued until 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act 6 sought to
strengthen tribal government and to halt the policy of dismantling
Indian tribes. The 1950s, however, brought fresh efforts to disband
tribes and to force the assimilation of their members into American society. Congress "terminated" many tribes,7 and encouraged
states to exercise jurisdiction over tribal reservations. 8
In recent years, the policy of forced assimilation of Indians
again has been abandoned, with a renewed effort being made to
strengthen tribal self-government and to require tribal consent for
jurisdictional changes affecting Indian reservations." History provides no guarantee, however, that the federal government will continue to protect the political autonomy with which the nation's Indian tribes began their relationship with the United States.
Furthermore, the existence of tribal governments within the territorial boundaries of states continues to pose important political,
jurisdictional, and constitutional questions involving the integration of tribal governments into a federal system.
The Road 0 properly identifies the political liberty of the Indian tribes as the most important legal issue confronting Indian
societies today. The book offers a long and sometimes disorganized

' General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-358 (1976)). See generally J. KINNEY, A CoNTINENT LOsT-A CIWLIZATION WON
(1937).
6 Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 462-479 (1976)).
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564x (1976) (Klamath Indians); id. §§ 691-708 (Western
Or. Indians); Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (Menominee Indians). See generally Wilkinson & Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 Am.
INDIAN L. REv. 139 (1977).
* See Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified in scattered sections of 18,
28 U.S.C.). See generally Goldberg, Public Law 280. The Limits of State Jurisdictionover
Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975).
* See, e.g., Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 95-195, 91 Stat. 1415 (1977)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 711 (Supp. II 1978)); Indian Self-Determination and Educational
Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 5,
25, 42, 50 U.S.C.); Indian Financing Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (1974)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543 (1976)); Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1976)). See generally MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNrrED STATES TRANSMITrING REcOMMENDATIONS

FOR INDIAN

POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
10 R. BARSH & J. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLrrIcAL LIBERTY (1980)
[hereinafter cited without cross-reference as BARSH & HENDERSON].
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survey of the historical vagaries of the legal relationships between
the Indian tribes and the federal and state governments since the
colonial era. This march through history has two purposes. The
first is to show that the courts never have established a consistent
and sensible constitutional theory that accommodates and protects
Indian tribal sovereignty within a system of federal and state governments. Like congressional Indian policy,11 the Supreme Court's
approach to the question of the Indian tribes' role in American legal theory has vacillated between theories of subjugation of the
tribes to the states,1 2 and protection of tribal autonomy from state
encroachments. 3 Regrettably, the authors fail to highlight the interesting point that the Supreme Court's views on Indian tribal
sovereignty often have conflicted with the policies Congress simultaneously was attempting to implement. One of the most dramatic
4
disparities occurred when the Court in Worcester v. Georgia1
reaffirmed the sovereign and autonomous status of the Cherokee Nation as a domestic dependent nation at the very time the federal
government and the states were seeking to remove eastern tribes to
land west of the Mississippi. 5
The second purpose of the historical and legal survey
presented in The Road is to provide the basis for the authors' suggestion that the tribal governments return to a concept of "treaty
See text and notes at notes 4-9 supra.
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 71-76 (1962); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). Cf. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding
the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), the goal of which was to place tribes
under state control).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
'

12

13

14

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).

"

For a discussion of Worcester, see 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED

STATES HISTORY 189-239 (1922); Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and

Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969); Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3
AM. INDIAN L. REv. 7 (1975).
There are other instances in which the Court and Congress have been at odds over

Indian policy. For example, when Congress was trying to strengthen tribal governments, see
note 9 supra, the Court held, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978),
that tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because of "the inherent limitations of tribal powers that stem from their incorporation into the United States," id. at 209.
See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 100 S.Ct. 2069 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). Similarly, when
Congress was trying to implement Public Law 280 and its termination legislation during the
1950s, the Court decided Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the most forceful (if not the
clearest) reaffirmation of Indian tribal sovereignty since Worcester.
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federalism" 16 in order to establish and protect the political liberty
of the tribes. The concept of treaty federalism seems intended to
assure Indian tribes the right to political autonomy and self-government similar to that enjoyed by the states. In the authors' view,
making clear the legal and political status of the tribes would provide the courts with the basis they have hitherto lacked for adopting general principles with which to approach federal, state, and
to be to remove the
tribal relations. One specific purpose seems
' 17
capriciously.
act
to
"opportunities
courts'
The authors' suggestion for realizing the "treaty federalism"
idea is surprising: they propose a constitutional amendment to
protect the political liberty of Indian tribes. This amendment,
whose language The Road offers, would treat all tribes as states,
protect their powers to fix the criteria for their own membership,
prevent jurisdictional encroachment by the states except pursuant
to compacts approved by Congress, and provide for limited voting
representation of the tribes in Congress through House and Senate
tribal caucuses. In deference to their concept of treaty federalism,
however, the authors make their amendment applicable only to
those tribes that consent to it by a vote of two-thirds of their voting members.1 8
While The Road correctly diagnoses the central legal issue
confronting federal Indian law today-the lack of a coherent legal
and political approach to Indian affairs-the path it takes to arrive
at its destination misdirects the reader toward a fairly revolutionary solution to the problem. The authors attempt to arrive at an
answer that fits within their view of the political theory of the
American Revolution-especially the thought of Madison and
Hamilton-and that of political theorists such as Locke and
Filmer:19 "Treaty federalism is not an entirely novel idea. It simply
reinterprets the sources of federal Indian law to be more consistent
in a way
with our general political and ideological heritage, and
20
reconcilable with the realities of tribal survival today.
The flaw in attempting to make the treaty federalism idea
consistent with the thoughts of Enlightenment theorists"Treaty federalism" is defined and discussed in BARSH & HENDERSON at 59, 270-82.
The idea is that all dealings between the tribes and the federal government must be by
mutual agreement, much as foreign sovereigns deal with each other through treaties.
17 Id. at xii.
18Id. at 279-82.
19 Id. at 12-19.
20 Id. at 275.
1"
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references to which are intertwined with the book's description of
federal Indian law-is that the necessity for doing so is never adequately established. The recurring references to the political theory of the Revolution seem to imply that the Founders intended to
impose their own ideas of political liberty on the Indian tribes. Yet
nowhere do the authors adduce any historical evidence to show
that such an intent actually existed. Without such a showing, there
seems no reason to believe it especially important to reconcile federal Indian policy with eighteenth century political notions.
The authors' reliance on Revolutionary theorists is objectionable for another reason as well. Relying on these thinkers does a
disservice to the very tribal sovereignty the authors seek to protect: it assures federal superiority, allowing for the imposition of
alien political theories and organizations on the Indian tribes. It
seems strange that The Road, so concerned with Indian rights,
looks solely to Anglo-American theory for a proposal to protect
those rights, with no discussion of what would accord with Indian
thinking.
More careful attention to the early history of the evolution of
the constitutional grant of federal power over Indian affairs would
have suggested a less tortuous path toward the salutary objectives
sought by the authors. Such an approach would have made possible a less radical and less politically unfeasible solution than the
constitutional amendment suggested in The Road.
The body of the Constitution mentions the Indians twice.
First, the document expressly excludes "Indians not taxed" from
the enumeration of state citizens for purposes of congressional apportionment.2 1 Of far greater importance than this reference, however, is the grant of authority to Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce
... with the Indian Tribes. ' 22 These clauses were an attempt to
deal with two important problems in the regulation of Indian affairs by colonial authorities and, later, by the Continental Congress
under the Articles of Confederation. The first issue was whether
Indian affairs should be regulated by a strong central authority
(the Crown or the subsequent national government) or only by the
individual colonies or states. The second issue was the legal status
of the Indian tribes: were they autonomous, self-governing states,
or were they wholly subject to the authority of colonial or state
governments? The failure to adopt a coherent legal philosophy relU.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2.
22 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
21
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ative to the tribes during the colonial and Articles of Confederation periods led to problems with the Indians that culminated in
wars on the eve of the framing of the Constitution. The clauses in
the Constitution referring to the Indians were intended to resolve
these conflicts by placing the management of Indian affairs exclusively in the hands of the federal government, and by guaranteeing
the Indian tribes legal and political autonomy as sovereigns exempt from federal and state control over their internal affairs. The
intent was, further, that the tribes would be within the sway of
federal power only for matters affecting "commerce" between the
tribes and non-Indians.
During the colonial period, differences over the management
of Indian affairs and the legal status of the tribes plagued the
English authorities in America. The Crown generally adhered to
the view that, as separate peoples, the Indians were politically and
legally autonomous within their territory until they voluntarily
ceded their land to the Crown or were conquered in a just war, a
view suggested by both international law and English common
law.23
By contrast, the colonies were divided in their approach to the
management of Indian affairs. In New England and Virginia, the
colonists claimed the right to appropriate uncultivated land of the
Indians as vacant waste, a claim that frequently led to armed Indian response.2 Although the Crown occasionally intervened to
protect the Indians from such claims,25 the management of Indian
affairs was left principally to colonial authorities until the midseventeenth century. Virginia, Connecticut, and the Massachusetts
Bay Colony therefore were able to subjugate rapidly many eastern
tribes. These colonies also claimed authority to govern and manage
the affairs of the dependent tribes. 26 The colonial authorities in
13

Cf. Campbell v. Hall, 1 Cowp. 204, 209, 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047 (K.B. 1774) ("[T]he

laws of a conquered country continue in force, until they are altered by the conqueror"); 1
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *76-*78 (Oxford 1765) (discussing
areas of England where local customs were allowed to continue); F. DE VrrORlIA, DE INDis ET
DE JURE BELLI REFLECTIONES 120-24, 155-61 (E. Nys trans. 1917) (commenting that while
savages can be legal owners of property, a conqueror in a just war has plenary power over
his enemy).
U See F. JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA 77-84, 133-45 (1975).
11 4 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETrS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND 158-59, 176, 190, 198-99, 213 (N. Shurtleff ed. 1968).
16 See, e.g., THE EARLIEST LAWS OF THE NEW HAVEN AND CONNECTICUT COLONIES 106-07
(J. Cushing ed. 1977); LAws OF THE COLONIAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS RELATING TO INDIANS
AND INDIAN AFFAIRS 12-14, 15-19 (1832) (Massachusetts); 3 VIRGINIA STATUTES AT LARGE 464-
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New York, however, more often dealt with the mighty Six Nation
Confederacy of the Iroquois through diplomatic means befitting a
separate sovereign people.2 7 Similarly, the Carolinas and, later,
Virginia treated the Cherokees as a separate and autonomous
state.2 The important case of Mohegan Indians v. Governor of
Connecticut,2 9 heard through royal commissions and in the Privy
Council between 1703 and 1733, attempted to resolve the legal status of Indian tribes. While the fundamental issue in the Mohegan
Indians case involved a land dispute between the tribe and the
colony, among the other issues presented was the legal status of
the Indian tribes. Throughout the proceedings, the colonial authorities challenged the jurisdiction of the royal commissions and the
Privy Council, claiming that the Indians were subject to colonial
authority and law and that the dispute should be resolved by colonial courts. In each instance the colonial claim was rejected and
jurisdiction sustained. In 1743 the Court of Commissioners explained its assertion of jurisdiction:
The Indians, though living amongst the king's subjects in
these countries, are a separate and distinct people from
them, they are treated with as such, they have a polity of
their own, they make peace and war with any nation of Indians when they think fit, without controul from the English."
In affirming the autonomous and sovereign status of the Indian
tribes, the Mohegan Indians case was the precursor by almost a
century of the strong reaffirmation of Indian tribal sovereignty in
Worcester v. Georgias1
While English law could proclaim the autonomous sovereign

69 (W. Hening ed. 1821).

" See generally A. TRELEASE, INDIAN AFFAIRS IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1960). Even in New York, however, encroachment by colonists on Indian
land continued. See generally G. NAMMACK, FRAUD, POLITICS, AND THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE
INDIANs (1969).
" J. REInD, A BETTER KIND OF HATCHET 23-24 (1976).
" For discussion of this case, see GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, AND
MOHEAGAN INDIANS (London 1769) (available in the collection of the Houghton Library,
Harvard University). See also J. DE FOREST, HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF CONNECTICUT 30442, 447-64 (1851); J.H. SMITH, APPEALS To THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 422-42 (1950); Beardsley, The Mohegan Land Controversy, in 3 PAPERS OF THE NEW
HAVEN COLONY HISTORICAL

SOCIETY 205-25 (1882).

30 GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT, AND MOHEAGAN INDIANS,

supra note

29, at

126 (Opinion of Comm'r Horsmanden, Aug. 1, 1743) (emphasis in original), quoted (inaccurately) in BARSH & HENDERSON at 32.
31 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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status of Indian tribes, the Crown was unable to protect Indian
rights so long as the management of Indian affairs lay principally
with colonial authorities. Land frauds, inattention to the protection of the Indians from encroachment by white settlers, and fear
of English intentions and expansion led many Indian tribes, particularly the Six Nations, to remain neutral or even side with the
French during King George's War. Efforts by colonial authorities
to enlist Indian support for the English demonstrated the disunity
32
and ineptitude of the colonial management of Indian affairs.
Thus in 1751 a member of the Council of the Colony of New York,
noting that "the preservation of the whole continent depends upon
a proper regulation of the Six Nations," recommended that the
management of Indian affairs be taken away from the colonial
commissioners in Albany and placed under the direction of a single
superintendent of Indian affairs.33

The greatest impetus for a structural change in the management of Indian affairs occurred when a Mohawk leader threatened
at a conference during the summer of 1753 to break the chain of
friendship that allied the Six Nations to the Colony of New York,
as a result of a list of complaints over land frauds and illegal encroachments by whites against the Indians."4 This development set
the stage for the famous Albany Congress of 1754 which proposed
a Union of the Colonies that would have the power to "hold or
direct all Indian Treaties in which the general interest or welfare
of the Colonys may be concerned," to "make peace or declare War
with the Indian Nations," to "make such Laws as they judge necessary for the regulating all Indian Trade," and to regulate the
purchase of land from the Indians, at least outside of colonial
boundaries.3 5
Almost simultaneously, the English government acted to centralize the management of Indian affairs in officials directly responsible to the Crown.3 6 This centralization lasted until 1768 and

3' See, e.g., 6

DocuMENTs

RELATING TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF

NEw

YORK 302-03 (E. O'Callaghan ed. 1855) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as N.Y.
COL. Doc.]. See generally id. at 289-305.
33 A. KENNEDY, THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING AND PRESERVING THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE
INDIANS TO THE BRITISH INTEREST CONSIDERED 7 (London 1752), quoted in G. NAMMACK,
supra note 27, at 39 (footnote omitted).
34 6 N.Y. COL. Doc. at 781-88. See id. at 805-06 (memorandum of Oct. 30, 1753 concerning a meeting of Indians) ("Indian affairs at present are managed merely by expedients
there being no established Method of conducting them").
31Id. at 890.
" The main impetus for doing so was security against the French. Id. at 893-97 (giving
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included the appointment of superintendents for the management
of Indian affairs in the northern and southern colonies, 37 the Proclamation of 176338 which was designed to halt white encroachments on Indian territory and to introduce Crown control over Indian land cessions,39 and a plan formulated in 1764,40 but never
fully approved or implemented, for
the regulation of Indian Affairs both commercial and political
throughout all North America, upon one general system,
under the direction of Officers appointed by the Crown, so as
to sett [sic] aside all local interfering of particular Provinces,
which has been one great cause of the distracted state of Indian Affairs in general.4 1
Ironically, the very success of the earlier policies of central management of Indian affairs in allying the Indians (particularly the
Six Nations) with the English side had helped eliminate the
French as a potential ally of the Indians during the French and
Indian War, and so had rendered the benefits of the 1764 plan unworthy of the costs involved. The plan therefore was abandoned in
1768 in favor of a partial and unsuccessful return to decentralized
colonial management of Indian affairs.4
The newly independent United States thus was presented with
two important unresolved problems concerning Indian affairs: the
need to establish a centralized management of Indian matters and
the need to determine the legal status of the tribes. The immediate
response of the nation was as ambivalent and unsatisfactory as the
colonial attitude had been. While the early treaties between the
Continental Congress and the Indian tribes guaranteed the tribes
legal and political autonomy, 3 the national government was unable
to convince recalcitrant states both of the need for national man-

the English "the Command of the Indian Country [by control of trade] and consequently of
the Indians ... is the only way to preserve their Fidelity and alliance," id. at 895); id. at
901-04, 916-20.
37 F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 11-13 (1962).

Reprinted in 1 DocUmENTs RELATING TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF CANADA
163-68 (2d ed. A. Shorte & A. Doughty 1918), and in 3 W. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN
AND THE UNrrED STATES 2135-39 (1973).
39 F. PRUCHA, supra note 37, at 13-21.
40 Reprinted in 7 N.Y. COL. Doc. at 637-41.
41

Id. at 634-35.

8 id. at 19-26, 55-58.
See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, arts. V, XII, XIII, 7 Stat. 18;
Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, arts. IV, VI, 7 Stat. 13.
4
4
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agement of Indian affairs and of the existence of the political autonomy of the Indian tribes from state or even national control.
The language in article IX of the Articles of Confederation reflects
the lack of resolution of these issues by granting to the Continental
Congress "the sole and exclusive right and power of.

.

.regulating

the trade and managing all affairs with Indians not members of
any of the states; provided, that the legislative right of any state
within its own limits be not infringed or violated."' 44 How this am-

biguous and internally inconsistent grant of Indian-affairs power to
the national government was
supposed to work was, as Madison
'45
put it, "incomprehensible.

The impossibility of successful management by the national
government during the Articles of Confederation period was evident in several areas. Perhaps the greatest failure involved Indian
land rights. States often claimed both the right of preemption-the right to acquire Indian land upon its voluntary cession
or abandonment or through conquest-and the power to enter into
treaties with the tribes to extinguish the Indians' claims to land,
thereby frustrating and sometimes actively interfering with efforts
by the national government to negotiate treaties. For example, federal treaty negotiations with the Six Nations were physically disrupted by New York authorities who claimed the exclusive right to
treat with those Indians. 4 ' North Carolina and Georgia protested
to Congress regarding the national government's interference with
its domestic affairs when the Continental Congress approved the
Treaty of Hopewell,47 guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the
48
Cherokee Nation.

The Continental Congress could do little to control the states
in this regard. In 1783, when it tried to protect Indian lands from
encroachment by white settlers, it was able to secure approval only
for a proclamation forbidding the cession or grant of Indian lands
"without the limits or jurisdiction of any particular state,
44

4

9

ab-

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 2. See generally 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTI-

NENTAL CONGRESS 674-89 (1776) [hereinafter
CONG.]; 6 id. at 1076-79; 9 id. at 844-45.

cited without cross-reference as J.

CONT.

4 THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 284 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
41 8 PA.ERS OF JAMES MADISON 140-42 (1973).
41Reprinted in 30 J. CONT. CONG. 187-90.
48

28 id. at 297; 32 id. at 237, 367; 4

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS

38-39 (North Carolina's

complaints about the Hopewell treaty). See id. at 17 ("[The treaty is] a manifest and direct
attempt to violate the retained sovereignty and legislative right of this State, and repugnant
to the principles and harmony of the Federal union").
41 25 J. CONT. CONG. 602.
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sent the express consent of Congress. Tribes within a state thus
were unprotected. When Georgia, whose unilateral treaty making
spawned an Indian war on the eve of the convening of the Constitutional Convention," sought the national government's assistance,
a committee of the Continental Congress summarized the national
government's frustration:
An avaricious disposition in some of our people to acquire
large tracts of land and often by unfair means, appears to be
the principal source of difficulties with the Indians ....
The
committee conceive that it has been long the opinion of the
country, supported by Justice and humanity, that the Indians
have just claims to all lands occupied by and not fairly purchased from them ....
It cannot be supposed, the state has
the powers [to make war with Indians or buy land from them]
without making [the Indian affairs clause of article IX] useless.. . and no particular state can have an exclusive interest
in the management of Affairs with any of the tribes, except in
5
some uncommon cases. 2
The framers of the Constitution were aware of the failures of
the Articles and of the need to deal with these two previously unresolved issues in the field of Indian affairs. On June 19, 1787
Madison requested the Constitutional Convention to consider
whether a plan offered by the New Jersey delegation would remedy
the deficiencies of the Articles:
Will it prevent encroachments on the Federal authority? A
tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified among ourselves, as well as in every other confederated
republic ....
By the Federal Articles, transactions with the
Indians appertain to Congress, yet in several instances the
States have entered into treaties and wars with them.5 2
50 See 32 id. at 365-69 (report of the Secretary of War, July 18, 1787); 33 id. at 407-08
(motion by Georgia delegates to warn the Indians against hostilities, July 26, 1787); id. at
454-63 (motion by William Blount to call for a conference between the Indians and Georgia,
and a committee report on Indian affairs, Aug. 3, 1787); 34 id. at 13 (report of a letter from
the governor of Georgia stating the reasons for going to war, Jan. 23, 1788); id. at 326 (motion by Georgia delegates to warn the Indians, July 15, 1788); id. at 362-66 (report of the
Secretary of War on war preparations, July 28, 1788).
51 33 id. at 457-59 (1787). For a more recent effort to illuminate the meaning of the
Indian affairs clause of article IX, see United States v. Oneida Nation, 576 F.2d 870, 879-81
(Ct. Cl. 1978), af'g 37 Ind. Cl. Comm. 522, 542 (1976). But see Six Nations v. United States,
173 Ct. CL 899, 906-07 (1965).
53 U.S. CONSTITUTION CoNVENTION, 1787, JOURNAIL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 190
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In adopting the "Indians not taxed" language in the Constitution,
the framers thus showed that they rejected the notion, partially
recognized in article IX of the Articles of Confederation, that some
Indian tribes were subject to both state and federal control. Their
exclusion from the enumeration for apportionment purposes reflects their autonomous political status.
More importantly, the Constitution vested exclusive authority
to regulate "Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes" in the Congress, freeing the grant of federal power over Indian affairs from
the ambiguous and counterproductive reservation of state authority that had plagued the Indian affairs clause of article IX. The
Indian commerce clause also recognized the sovereign status of the
tribes by including them in the same clause with "foreign Nations"
and "the several States." In The Federalist,Madison wrote of the
advantages of the Indian commerce clause over its counterpart in
the Articles:
The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is very
properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of
confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe the
legislative right of any State within its own limits. What
description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is
not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity
and contention in the foederal Councils. And how the trade
with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing
within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights
of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible."
Years later, in Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall
explained the constitutional solution to the status of Indian tribes
adopted by the framers, writing:
That instrument [the Constitution] confers on congress the
powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that
is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indi(E. Scott ed. 1898).
1- THE FEDERALiST No. 42, supra note 45, at 284.
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ans. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The shackles imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded.
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil,
from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power .

. .

. The very term "nation," so

generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from
others." The constitution, by declaring treaties already made,
as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land
. . . consequently admits [the Indians] among those powers

who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and
"nation" are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings.

.

.

. We have applied them

to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of
the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense."
Chief Justice Marshall correctly reflected the decision of the framers of the Constitution to vest sole and exclusive power of managing the bilateral relations with the Indians--"Commerce ...

with

the Indian Tribes"-in the federal government while constitutionalizing and protecting the sovereign and separate status of the
tribes. This view thus represents the culmination and resolution of
over a century of legal and constitutional debate over the status of
the Indian tribes.
The concept of tribal sovereignty expressed by Chief Justice
Marshall did not last long, however. 55 The Supreme Court, ignor31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1831) (emphasis in original). Marshall also wrote:
Certain it is, that our history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our
country, of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of
the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as traders or
otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances. The king purchased their lands
when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take; but never coerced a
surrender of them. He also purchased their alliance and dependence by subsidies; but
never intruded into the interior of their affairs, or interfered with their self government, so far as respected themselves only.
Id. at 547. See generally Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origin of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L.
REv. 17, 19-38 (1979).
" For the Court's abandonment of Chief Justice Marshall's views, see Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 100 S. Ct. 2069 (1980); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,

411 U.S. 164 (1973); Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Utah & N. Ry.
v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (suggesting
'that to preclude all state jurisdiction over Indian tribes within the state's territory, Congress

1980]

Review

ing the Indian commerce clause and the history from which it
emerged, quickly abandoned Marshall's approach. In its place, the
Court adopted a theory of state control and subjugation of the
tribes, similar to the claims asserted by Connecticut and rejected
by the Privy Council over a century earlier in the Mohegan Indians case.5" Since then, the problem of integrating the sovereignty
of Indian tribes into a coherent theory of constitutional law within
the framework of our federal system has continued to pose
problems for the courts and created the twisted path of legal decisions that constitutes federal Indian law.
Rather than looking to the historical implications of the Indian commerce clause for the solution to disputes between state
and tribal authorities, the Court in recent years has looked principally to a theory of federal treaty and statutory preemption. 7 As
the Court has said, "[t]he Indian sovereignty doctrine [of Worcester v. Georgia] is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes
must be read."58 In further contravention of the intent of the framers and the Worcester doctrine, Congress has asserted and the Supreme Court has ratified the doctrine of "plenary" federal power
over the Indians. 5 It is a long, twisted path indeed from the framers' decision to give Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce and other relations with the Indian tribes to the modern
assertion of plenary federal power over them.
As The Road correctly points out, the approach taken by the
Supreme Court and Congress is inappropriate and legally and morally inconsistent. The Road fails to give its historical survey proper
focus, however. It devotes only four pages 0 to the vital events of
the colonial period, the Articles of Confederation, and the era culminating in the drafting of the Indian commerce clause. Yet it is

must say so expressly); Langford v. Montieth, 102 U.S. 145 (1880) (in absence of treaty to
the contrary, Indian lands-though not necessarily the Indians-are under state control);
United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 566 (1846) (dictum).
"See text and notes at notes 29-30 supra.
67McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). See Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 100 S. Ct. 2069, 2081-84 (1980).
" McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
69 See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56-58 (1978); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 64546 (1977); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-49 (1913); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
60BARSH & HENDERSON at 31-34.
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there that an historically defensible constitutional theory of Indian
tribal political liberty can be derived. By ignoring this crucial period, the authors of The Road have created an ill-conceived plan
for Indian tribal liberty-it is a path that leads off a cliff. Their
suggestion of a constitutional amendment to protect tribal liberty
is unnecessary and, what is worse, inconsistent with their asserted
theory of treaty federalism. Acceptance of their proposal is unlikely because it would demand a sharp break with the processes
traditionally invoked for the resolution of Indian affairs. Furthermore, the authors seem to forget that the process for amending the
Constitution requires the approval of three-fourths of the states,"1
thereby giving the states a potential veto over their proposal. Such
a plan would return to the states an important decision making
role in Indian policy that the Indian commerce clause was intended to preclude.
Greater attention to the constitutional history surrounding the
adoption of the Indian commerce clause would have contributed
much more persuasive arguments in support of the authors' position on Indian rights. Such a focus would have brought The Road
back to the original intention of the framers of the Constitution, to
Chief Justice Marshall's recognition of exclusive federal power to
manage bilateral relations with the Indian tribes and of the sole
right of the tribes to govern their members and their internal affairs free from unwanted federal or state interference.

61 U.S. CONST. art. V.

